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YOU’RE ONLY AS GOOD AS YOUR TAX SOFTWARE: THE TAX 
COURT’S WRONGFUL APPROVAL OF THE TURBOTAX 
DEFENSE IN OLSEN V. COMMISSIONER 
Kacey Marr 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2011, the United States Tax Court disallowed the 
imposition of accuracy-related penalties on taxpayer Kurt Olsen who 
made an input error on his federal income tax return while using tax 
preparation software.1  Only seven pages long and carrying no 
precedential value, the summary opinion seemed as innocuous as any 
other tax case.2  However, the opinion quickly created a stir among tax 
experts.3 
Kurt Olsen was the first taxpayer to successfully argue the so-called 
“TurboTax Defense” to the Tax Court.4 The thrust of the defense is that 
tax penalties should be excused if tax reporting mistakes are caused by 
the tax preparation software.5  It has also been referred to as the 
“Geithner Defense” after US Department of Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner implied during his confirmation hearing that he was relieved 
from accuracy-related penalties, at least partially, because his tax return 
mistakes were caused by TurboTax.6  
After Geithner publicly blamed the software, many taxpayers who 
had been assessed accuracy-related penalties by the Internal Revenue 
 
  Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 7 (2011).  Olsen and his wife filed joint federal 
income tax returns, but Olsen “usually takes the lead in preparing” returns, as was the case for the return 
at issue.  Id. at 3. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Laura Saunders, Tax Court Approves ‘Geithner Defense’ Surprising Experts, WALL 
STREET ST. JOURNAL TOTAL RETURN (Nov. 25, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2011/ 11/25/tax-
court-approves-geithner-defense-surprising-experts/ [hereinafter Surprising Experts] (“The case has 
caught the eye of tax experts, as in several other cases the Court has turned a deaf ear to taxpayer pleas 
for penalty abeyance due to mistakes made while using tax-prep software.”). 
 4. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 7 (holding that Olsen is not liable to the accuracy-related penalty 
under I.R.C. § 6662(a) for his data entry error that prevented the tax preparation software from reporting 
a source of income properly). 
 5. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, For First Time, Tax Court Approves Use of Geithner/Turbo Tax 
Defense, TAXPROF BLOG (Nov. 25, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/11/for-first-
time.html [hereinafter For First Time] (“[T]axpayer’s use of the Geithner/TurboTax Defense . . . to 
blame mistakes in his use of tax preparation software to excuse him for penalties for failing to report 
income on his return.”). 
 6. See Peter Pappas, Geithner Tax Defense Doesn’t Work for the Small People, TAX LAW. 
BLOG (June 23, 2010), http://www.pappasontaxes.com/index.php/2010/06/23/geithner-defense-doesnt-
work-for-the-small-people/ (“Geithner was . . . relieved of the penalties based, at least in part, on his 
contention that his tax software, TurboTax, screwed up.”). 
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Service (IRS) decided to test the TurboTax Defense in the Tax Court, 
and for a time, all were rejected.7  Tax and accounting experts became 
used to, and even amused by, the Tax Court’s unwillingness to accept 
the defense after Geithner’s admission.8  Thus, when Olsen successfully 
used the defense, experts erupted with shock and criticism.9 
This criticism is not unfounded.  The Tax Court improperly allowed 
Olsen to use the TurboTax Defense, not just because it went against 
precedent, but also because the defense did not fit the facts of the case 
and because the Tax Court could have reached the same result with 
other, more viable options.  Part II of this Note investigates the rise of 
the TurboTax Defense; specifically, the catalyst effect of Geithner’s 
testimony on the defense strategies of taxpayers who had similarly used, 
and misused, tax preparation software.  Part III discusses circumstances 
under which the Tax Court allowed the defense in Olsen v. 
Commissioner, as well as the media aftermath.  Part IV will discuss the 
correctness of the Olsen decision and compare the allowance of the 
TurboTax Defense with other, more fitting alternatives, including the 
appropriateness of imposing the penalties assessed by the IRS. 
This Note argues that the Olsen decision was not properly based on 
the TurboTax Defense, both because of the facts and because of recent 
precedent.  If the Tax Court wanted to avoid penalizing the taxpayer, it 
could have reached the same result through other, less controversial 
 
 7. See, e.g., Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (2011); Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summ.Op. 2010-78 (2010); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82 (2010).  See also Paul L. Caron, 
Geithner Blames Turbo Tax for His Tax Troubles, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 22, 2009), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2009/01/geithner-blames-.html [hereinafter Geithner Blames] 
(“Timothy Geithner implied at his confirmation hearing that the mistakes in his tax returns were caused 
by his use of the TurboTax software program.”); Paul L. Caron, Tax Court Rejects Taxpayer’s Attempt 
to Use Geithner’s TurboTax Defense, TAXPROF BLOG (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2009/08/tax-court-rejects.html (“The Tax Court yesterday 
rejected a taxpayer’s attempt to use the TurboTax defense successfully employed by Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner.”); Paul L. Caron, Tax Court Again Rejects Geithner/ TurboTax Defense, TAXPROF 
BLOG, Nov. 12, 2010, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/ 2010/11/tax-court.html (“The Tax Court 
yesterday again rejected . . . use of the “Geithner defense”). 
 8. See, e.g., Caleb Newquist, For the Last Time, Only Tim Geithner Can Blame TurboTax and 
Get Away with It, GOING CONCERN (June 23, 2010), http://goingconcern.com/2010/6/for-the-last-time-
only-tim-geithner-can-blame-turbotax-and-get-away-with-it [hereinafter For the Last Time] (“If you are 
a not a well-connected bureaucrat with a fabulous coif, you are not afforded the same privileges as 
[those] who are/do.”); Ashby Jones, Tax Court: If You’re Gonna Use TurboTax, Use it Correctly, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/20/tax-court-if-youre-gonna-use-turbotax-use-
it-correctly/ [hereinafter Use it Correctly] (“In other words, it’s not enough to blame TurboTax. You’ve 
got to make sure you’re using TurboTax correctly.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, No More Laughing at TurboTax Defense, FORBES (Dec. 8, 
2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/12/08/no-more-laughing-at-turbotax-defense/ 
[hereinafter No More Laughing] (“I thought the TurboTax Defense was silly, but no more.  Now that the 
Tax Court embraced it in Olsen v. Commissioner, it looks downright legitimate.”); Surprising Experts, 
supra note 3 (“The case has caught the eye of tax experts, as in several other cases the Court has turned 
a deaf ear to taxpayer pleas for penalty abeyance due to mistakes made while using tax-prep software.”). 
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means.  However, this Note ultimately concludes that the Tax Court 
should have imposed penalties, which would have been congruent with 
precedent and would have avoided further expanding and complicating 
tax jurisprudence. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Beginning in 2009, taxpayers who were assessed accuracy-related 
penalties by the IRS due to underpayment on taxes found a creative new 
way to defend their mistakes—namely, by blaming it on their tax 
preparation software.10  The catalyst behind the so-called TurboTax 
Defense was U.S. Department of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, 
who had understated his tax liabilities by approximately $50,000 over a 
five year period.  The IRS relieved Geithner of accuracy-related 
penalties, at least in part, because of his claim that the mistakes were 
caused by his TurboTax software.11 
A. The Rise of the “Geithner Defense” 
On January 26, 2009, Timothy Geithner was sworn in as the 75th 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.12  Prior to taking 
office, his nomination came under fire when it was discovered that he 
had made certain errors in his past tax returns, which were considered 
serious offenses and could have potentially disqualified him13 from 
serving as the head of the government body responsible for, inter alia, 
collecting taxes, enforcing tax laws, and prosecuting tax evaders.14  
The Senate Finance Committee released a memorandum documenting 
Geithner’s tax troubles.15  For the taxable years between 2001 and 2006, 
Geithner made several errors that resulted in tax adjustments totaling 
around $50,000.16  The most significant tax concern involved his failure 
to pay social security taxes during his employment at the International 
 
 10. See Anyika, 101 T.C.M. at 6; Parker, T.C. Summ.Op. 2010-78; Lam, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82. 
 11. Pappas, supra note 6 (“Geithner was . . . relieved of the penalties based, at least in part, on 
his contention that his tax software, TurboTax, screwed up.”). 
 12. About the Secretary, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY (Oct. 28 2012, 10:22 AM), 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/Pages/Secretary.aspx. 
 13. Jonathan Weisman, Geithner’s Tax History Muddles Confirmation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123187503629378119.html [hereinafter Muddles Confirmation]. 
 14. Duties and Functions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 
2012). 
 15. Carol Guthrie & Jill Kozeny, Comment Regarding Treasury Nominee Geithner, U.S. SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ 
chairman/release/?id=f4382cc9-6fb9-4e2e-90a4-46b3b4caa16d. 
 16. Id. at 1. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF).17   
As an international organization, the IMF is exempted from the 
Federal Insurance Contributions Act and therefore does not pay the 
employer share of social security taxes.18  Thus, IMF employees who 
are U.S. citizens must pay self-employment taxes with respect to 
compensation.19  To further this end, the IMF provides its employees 
with documents to help employees understand and meet their federal, 
state, and self-employment tax obligations.20  Despite having received 
all of these documents, and despite his past experience with social 
security tax issues, Geithner failed to pay social security and self-
employment taxes from 2001 to 2004, with the deficiencies totaling 
$42,702.21  
Geithner agreed to IRS adjustments for the taxable years 2003 and 
2004, and Geithner voluntarily submitted payments for 2001 and 2002 
resulting from his failure to pay the self-employment taxes.22  The IRS 
then waived the accuracy-related penalties.23  He was relieved of these 
penalties, at least in part, because of his contention that TurboTax was to 
blame.24  
After Geithner’s confirmation hearing, where he publicly implied that 
the mistakes in his tax returns were caused by tax preparation software, 
tax experts were quick to debunk the possibility that the mistakes were 
caused by TurboTax.25  Paul Caron, Pepperdine University School of 
Law professor and popular tax blogger,26 said that “TurboTax (and any 
other leading software program) easily calculates self-employment 
tax.”27  Likewise, Jim Lindgren, a law professor at Northwestern 
University Law School,28 conclusively demonstrated that Geithner’s 
 
 17. See id. at 2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1, 3.  Geithner began working for IMF in 2001 and concluded his work there in 2003, 
with some of his compensation being paid in 2004.  Id. at 2.  Therefore, he failed to meet his tax 
obligations during his entire tenure at IMF.  Id.; see also Muddles Confirmation, supra note 13  (IRS 
concluded Geithner owed taxes for 2003 and 2004 totaling $17,230 and the Obama transition team 
discovered Geithner owed $25,970 from 2001 and 2002). 
 22. Muddles Confirmation, supra note 13. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Pappas, supra note 6. 
 25. See Geithner Blames, supra note 7 (“Of course, as any tax professional knows, TurboTax 
(and any of the other leading software programs) easily calculates self-employment tax.”). 
 26. See Paul L. Caron, PEPPERDINE UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://law.pepperdine.edu/academics/faculty/default.php?faculty=paul_caron (May 6, 2013, 2:40 PM); 
see also Molly McDonough, The 5th Annual ABA Journal Blawg 100, ABA J., Dec. 1, 2011, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_5th_annual_aba_ journal_blawg_100. 
 27. Geithner Blames, supra note 7. 
 28. See Faculty Profiles: James T. Lindgren, NW. U. L. SCHOOL, http://www.law.northwestern. 
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self-employment tax error would have been discovered by an interactive 
prompt in the 2004 version of TurboTax software.29 
B. Early Cases Using the TurboTax Defense 
After the publicity surrounding Geithner’s TurboTax claim, and 
Geithner’s ability to ward off accuracy-related penalties at least partly 
because of it, taxpayers facing penalties for understating income on their 
federal income tax returns started testing the TurboTax Defense in front 
of the Tax Court.30  Each case was met with substantially the same 
answer: “[T]he misuse of tax preparation software, even if unintentional 
or accidental, is no defense to penalties . . . .”31 
In Lam v. Commissioner, the taxpayer explicitly analogized her 
situation to that of Geithner to defend against accuracy-related penalties 
assessed by the IRS.32  When Ms. Lam used TurboTax for her income 
tax returns, she improperly combined losses from her real estate 
business with unrelated losses.33  The IRS disallowed the reported rental 
losses, re-characterized other losses, and then determined that Ms. Lam 
was liable for accuracy-related penalties.34  The IRS argued that 
penalties were warranted because Ms. Lam did not behave reasonably 
since she did not seek the help of a tax professional, consult with the 
IRS, visit the IRS website, or read any instructions on how to properly 
report her losses.35  Ms. Lam focused on the similarities between hers 
and Geithner’s situation and argued that she acted with reasonable cause 
because the mistakes were made using TurboTax.36  She cited a 
Wikipedia article about Geithner’s tax troubles to argue that her use of 
TurboTax resulted in mistakes on her taxes.37  The Tax Court briefly 
dismissed this argument, noting that it was not a flaw in the TurboTax 
software that caused Ms. Lam’s errors, and that her misuse of the 
software, even though not purposeful, was no defense to the penalties.38  
In a case decided just eight months prior to the Olsen decision, the 
 
edu/faculty/profiles/jameslindgren/ (Oct. 28, 2012, 10:44 AM). 
 29. Geithner Blames, supra note 7. 
 30. See Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (2011); Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 
2010-78 (2010); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82 (2010). 
 31. Anyika, 101 T.C.M. at 6; see also Lam, 99 T.C.M. at 3. 
 32. Lam, 99 T.C.M. at 3. 
 33. Id. at 1. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. at 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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Tax Court again rejected the taxpayer’s use of the TurboTax Defense.39  
In Anyika v. Commissioner, the Anyikas used TurboTax software to 
prepare their joint tax return and claimed deductions for managing rental 
properties.40  They did not consult tax professionals to find out whether 
or not the deductions were proper.41  The IRS disallowed the deductions 
and assessed penalties.42  The Tax Court noted that an exception to the 
imposition of penalties applied if the taxpayer could demonstrate 
reasonable cause and good faith by showing their efforts to assess 
proper tax liability, or by showing that they misunderstood a fact or the 
law in a manner that was reasonable for a taxpayer of similar 
experience, knowledge, and education.43  The Anyikas sought to prove 
the exception applied because the software was responsible for the 
miscalculations; however, they never provided any evidence to 
substantiate that claim.44  The Tax Court dismissed the TurboTax 
Defense and assessed penalties, again holding that the misuse of tax 
preparation software, whether purposeful or not, was not a defense 
against penalties.45  
Tax experts were intrigued by these results, as well as the many other 
attempts made by taxpayers to use the TurboTax Defense.46  News and 
blog articles even began to joke about the taxpayer who dared to blame 
TurboTax for their reporting mistakes.47  Despite the humor of all the 
failed attempts, tax experts recognized that Tim Geithner’s ability to 
successfully use the excuse was now incongruent with Tax Court 
holdings.48  
One case in particular seemed to spark the most controversy in the 
blogosphere.  In Parker v. Commissioner, taxpayer Parker fought 
accuracy-related penalties on facts strikingly similar to Tim Geithner’s 
situation.49  Starting in 2005, Parker, like Geithner, worked for the IMF, 
which did not withhold federal income tax or social security tax, and 
therefore obligated Parker to pay self-employment tax.50  Parker, like 
 
 39. Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322, 6 (2011). 
 40. Id. at 1. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 6. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., For the Last Time, supra note 8. 
 47. See, e.g., Use it Correctly, supra note 8 (“In other words, it’s not enough to blame TurboTax. 
You’ve got to make sure you’re using TurboTax correctly.”). 
 48. See, e.g., For the Last Time, supra note 8 (“If you are a not a well-connected bureaucrat with 
a fabulous coif, you are not afforded the same privileges as [those] who are/do.”). 
 49. Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2010-78 (2010). 
 50. Id. at 1–2. 
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Geithner, used TurboTax software to prepare his return, and, like 
Geithner, failed to pay self-employment tax.51  He claimed that 
“TurboTax had provided erroneous information . . . to wit, that the 
social security taxes were included in [his] taxes due.”52  
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and assessed the accuracy-related 
penalties.53  In a controversial footnote, the Tax Court addressed 
Parker’s contention that “the IRS granted ‘favorable treatment’ in a case 
involving US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner” and that 
“there should not be different[ ] or favorable rules for the well-
connected.”54  The Tax Court said that the facts of Parker’s case were 
not relevant to Geithner’s case and that, even if the facts were relevant, 
it would still be irrelevant to the holding because Parker was “required 
to establish on the basis of the facts and circumstances . . . in his own 
case” that the accuracy-related penalties should not be assessed.55 
Joe Kristan, tax technical director for Roth & Company and writer of 
TaxUpdate Blog, analogized the Parker decision to a tax law 
experiment.56  Kristan said the hypothesis was that Geithner got “a 
special deal because he’s a big shot” and that the “scientists at the Tax 
Court . . . validated this hypothesis.”57  He summarized the Tax Court’s 
holding as saying that the accuracy-related penalties “are for little 
people.”58  Editor of Going Concern Caleb Newquist, in pointing out 
that the Tax Court had again debunked a “likeness between a regular 
schmo” and Geithner, said that “[i]f you are not a well-connected 
bureaucrat with a fabulous coif, you are not afforded the same privileges 
as [those] who are/do.”59  Tax attorney and certified public accountant 
(CPA) Peter Pappas wrote in his blog that he did not necessarily 
disagree with the Parker decision, but that he thought “Geithner, 
especially because of his sophistication in financial matters, should have 
had to pay the penalty as well.”60 
III. OLSEN V. COMMISSIONER 
Despite many failed attempts by other taxpayers to employ the 
 
 51. Id. at 2. 
 52. Id. at 4. 
 53. Id. at 7. 
 54. Id. at 7 n.15. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Joe Kristan, The Geithner Rule Only Applies to Geithner, TAX UPDATE BLOG (June 22, 
2010), http://www.rothcpa.com/archives/006107.php. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. For the Last Time, supra note 8. 
 60. Pappas, supra note 6. 
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TurboTax Defense after Tim Geithner,61 taxpayer Kurt Olsen decided to 
try his hand at it in November 2011.62  Unexpectedly, Special Trial 
Judge Robert Armend ruled in favor of Olsen and accepted the defense 
for the first time, surprising tax experts, bloggers, and journalists.63 
A. The Tax Court’s Summary Opinion 
Kurt Olsen, a patent attorney for the Department of Energy, was 
accustomed to preparing his tax returns using tax preparation software.64  
In 2007, Olsen’s wife received interest income from a trust, along with a 
Schedule K-1 for reporting the interest income.65  The Olsens were 
unfamiliar with reporting procedures because they had never received a 
Schedule K-1.66  In an attempt to ensure proper treatment of the interest 
income, Olsen upgraded his tax preparation software to a more 
“sophisticated” version and used it to prepare the couple’s joint income 
tax return.67 
While transcribing the trust information, Olsen made a data entry 
error that prevented the interest income from being correctly displayed 
on his federal tax return.68  He reviewed the return using the software’s 
verification features, but he did not discover his error.69  The 
Commissioner determined a deficiency in Olsen’s federal income tax of 
$9,297 and assessed an accuracy-related penalty of $1,859.70 
On these facts, the Tax Court turned to whether Olsen was liable for 
the accuracy-related penalty, ultimately finding he was not.71  Under the 
Internal Revenue Code (Code), a penalty of 20 percent is imposed on 
the amount of underpayment that is attributable to a “substantial 
understatement of income tax.”72  An understatement, or the tax 
assessed, is substantial if it exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax 
required or $5,000.73  The Commissioner determined that the Olsens 
understated their taxes by over $9,000 and, therefore, could be assessed 
 
 61. See infra Part II(B). 
 62. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131 (2011). 
 63. See, e.g., Surprising Experts, supra note 3. 
 64. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 2–3 (noting Olsen “usually takes the lead in preparing the couple’s 
joint [f]ederal income tax returns.”). 
 65. Id. at 2.  A Schedule K-1 (Form 1065) is used for reporting “Beneficiary’s Share of Income, 
Deductions, Credits, etc.” on federal income tax returns.  Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 3. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2. 
 71. Id. at 2. 
 72. I.R.C. § 6662(a)&(b)(2) (2012); Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 3. 
 73. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A) (2012); Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 3–4. 
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an accuracy-related penalty.74  The Tax Court determined that the 
Commissioner had carried its burden and proven that Olsen’s 
understatement was substantial and that a penalty assessment would be 
otherwise proper.75  
However, the Tax Court noted that an exception to the imposition of 
an accuracy-related penalty would apply if Olsen could establish 
reasonable cause for the understatement and also demonstrate that he 
acted in good faith by, for example, showing the extent of his effort to 
assess the proper tax liability in preparing his return.76  Although it 
acknowledged that tax preparation software is only as good as the 
preparer’s ability to input the information, the Tax Court held that an 
isolated transcription error is not inconsistent with a finding of 
reasonable cause and good faith.77  
The Tax Court then determined that Olsen had acted reasonably and 
in good faith.78  As evidence, the Tax Court noted that this was the sole 
error, that he had never received a Schedule K-1, and that he upgraded 
his tax preparation software to a more sophisticated version in an 
attempt to properly report the unfamiliar income and then checked his 
work.79  The Tax Court also noted that, because Olsen worked for the 
federal government and held a security clearance subjecting him to 
periodic background checks, he would have “substantial motivation” to 
properly report income on his tax returns.80  Given these facts, the Tax 
Court held that Olsen had acted with reasonable cause and in good faith 
and was therefore not liable for the accuracy-related penalty.81  
B. Media and Expert Criticisms 
Just days after the Olsen decision was released, bloggers and 
newspapers reacted to the news that the Tax Court had, for the first time, 
accepted the TurboTax Defense.82  Forbes contributor Robert Wood 
said, “I thought the TurboTax Defense was silly, but no more.  Now that 
the Tax Court embraced it . . . it looks downright legitimate.”83  But 
experts quickly pointed out flaws in the summary opinion. 
 
 74. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 2. 
 75. Id. at 5. 
 76. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(a) (2012); Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 4. 
 77. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 5–6. 
 78. Id. at 7. 
 79. Id. at 6–7. 
 80. Id. at 6 n.4. 
 81. Id. at 7. 
 82. See, e.g., For First Time, supra note 5 (“The Tax Court . . . for perhaps the first time 
accepted a taxpayer’s use of the Geithner/TurboTax defense.”). 
 83. No More Laughing, supra note 9. 
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One point raised was that the opinion, although without precedential 
value, opened the floodgates for many other taxpayers who did an inept 
job at accounting for their taxes using preparation software.84  CPA Jay 
Starkman disagreed with the judgment, saying that “[s]uch mistakes 
happen all the time, and they are easy to make.  We’re likely to see more 
of these cases.”85  Wood argued that Olsen’s defense was not even a true 
TurboTax Defense, pointing out that the error was Olsen’s, not the tax 
software’s.86  If it had been a true software error, Wood argued, Olsen’s 
penalty relief claims would have been even better.87 
Readers commenting on the experts’ articles and blogs were also 
quick to poke holes in the Olsen decision.  One observer argued that, 
despite the Tax Court’s finding, Olsen did not make his best effort, 
saying that “[e]xperienced preparers know that simply using the 
verification procedure to validate one’s data entry is insufficient due 
diligence.”88  Another questioned Olsen’s judgment in not seeking 
professional advice, saying “[w]hat would [patent attorney Olsen] think 
of a novice trying to defend a patent matter?”89 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The Olsen decision came as a surprise to the tax community for 
several reasons.  Not only did it contradict a line of Tax Court cases that 
explicitly disallowed the TurboTax Defense,90 but it appeared to do so 
under a set of facts that did not accurately fit the defense,91 potentially 
opening the doors for an overwhelming amount of litigation.92  The Tax 
Court’s holding leaves behind a number of unanswered questions, 
including: Why apply the defense when the facts of the case do not 
match the argument? Why create a new defense when tax jurisprudence 
already offers justification for not imposing the accuracy-related 
penalties? And, perhaps most importantly, why not just hold Olsen 
liable for the penalties? 
Subpart A addresses the correctness of the Olsen holding, arguing 
 
 84. See Surprising Experts, supra note 3. 
 85. Id. 
 86. No More Laughing, supra note 9. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Michael Cohn, Tax Court Rules in Favor of TurboTax Defense, ACCT. TODAY (Nov. 29, 
2011), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/Tax-Court-Rules-Favor-TurboTax-Defense-60893-
1.html [hereinafter Tax Court Rules in Favor]. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See infra Part II(B), Part IV(A)(2), Part IV(B)(3). 
 91. See infra Part IV(A)(1). 
 92. See Surprising Experts, supra note 3 (“Such mistakes happen all the time, and they are easy 
to make.  We’re likely to see more of these cases.”). 
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that the approval of the TurboTax Defense was based on facts that do 
not appropriately match the law created, and that  the Tax Court should 
have followed precedent because the arguments for rejecting the 
TurboTax Defense in earlier decisions apply with equal, if not greater, 
strength to the Olsen case.  Subpart B addresses the alternatives that 
were available to the Tax Court.  First, if the Tax Court wanted to avoid 
penalizing the taxpayer, the Tax Court could have relied solely on 
Olsen’s reasonable cause and good faith, without reference to his use of 
tax preparation software.  Second, the Tax Court could have extended 
the reliance on professional advice exception to include the TurboTax 
Defense on the premise that tax preparation software is a “professional” 
providing advice.  Third, and most importantly, the Tax Court could 
have, and should have, found Olsen liable for accuracy-related penalties 
because the force of recent precedent properly disallows the TurboTax 
Defense on facts similar to those in the Olsen case. 
A. Correctness of the Olsen Holding 
The reasoning of previous Tax Court holdings rejecting the TurboTax 
Defense, as well as the criticisms of tax experts, journalists, and general 
observers, raises valid arguments that bring into question the correctness 
of the Olsen summary opinion.93  In particular, the allowance of the 
TurboTax Defense on a set of facts that did not fit the mold of the 
argument brings into question the Tax Court’s judgment.94  Likewise, 
the Tax Court’s decision to disallow penalties designed to reprimand 
taxpayers who make mistakes cuts directly against the reasoning used in 
recent precedential holdings.95 
1. “Bad Facts Make Bad Law”96 
The thrust of the TurboTax Defense is that tax penalties should be 
 
 93. See infra Part III. 
 94. See No More Laughing, supra note 9 (“If the software had made the error based on Olsen’s 
proper input, his penalty relief claims would be even better.  But Olsen made the mistake, not the 
software.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 95. See, e.g., Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (2011); Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summ.Op. 2010-78 (2010); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82 (2010). 
 96. The legal community often uses this phrase to indicate that, in some instances, a court will 
create new precedent based on a case with facts that are not appropriate to the new law created.  See, 
e.g., John Tredennick, Bad Facts Make Bad Law: ‘Mt. Hawley’ A Step Backward for Rule 502(b), 
CATALYST (July 6, 2010), http://www.catalystsecure.com/blog/2010/07/bad-facts-make-bad-law-mt-
hawley-a-step-backward-for-rule-502b/ (“In law school, we learned the old adage that bad facts often 
make bad law.  What it means is that judges are human.  When presented with compelling 
circumstances . . . judges sometimes get creative with the law.  In an effort to do justice, they make rules 
and interpret things in ways that don’t always make sense for later cases.”). 
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excused if tax reporting mistakes are caused by the tax preparation 
software.97  However, Olsen’s tax errors were not caused by the 
software, but rather by a data entry error—a human error.98  
As at least one expert has pointed out, the Olsen decision did not 
apply the true TurboTax Defense since Olsen himself made the error, 
and not his software.99 As the legal platitude goes, “bad facts make bad 
law.”100  If the Tax Court wanted to approve the TurboTax Defense, it 
should have waited to do so in a case where a taxpayer could prove that 
the tax return errors were actually caused by a flaw in tax preparation 
software and not by user error. 
2. Stare Decisis101 
Over the last few years since Geithner publicly implied that his tax 
return errors were caused by tax preparation software,102 the Tax Court 
has created a line of precedent explicitly disallowing the TurboTax 
Defense as a means of avoiding accuracy-related penalties.103  As 
discussed further in Part IV(B)(3), the Olsen Court should have 
followed precedent and imposed accuracy-related penalties. 
 In its previous decisions, the Tax Court found that taxpayers had not 
acted with reasonable cause and in good faith104 for various reasons—
they had not consulted tax professionals when faced with complex tax 
issues,105 they did not use the IRS website for guidance,106 or they 
should have known their taxes were not properly reported after 
reviewing their returns.107  The Tax Court should have applied this 
reasoning to the facts of Olsen because Olsen knew he had never dealt 
with the type of income he misreported,108 did not use a tax 
 
 97. See, e.g., For First Time, supra note 5 (“[T]axpayer’s use of the Geithner/TurboTax 
defense . . . to blame mistakes in his use of tax preparation software to excuse him for penalties for 
failing to report income on his return.”). 
 98. See Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 3 (2011). 
 99. See No More Laughing, supra note 9 (“[T]his was Olsen’s error, not the tax software’s.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 100. See Tredennick, supra note 96. 
 101. Stare decisis is a legal “doctrine or policy of following rules or principles laid down in 
previous judicial decisions unless they contravene the ordinary principles of justice.”  Stare Decisis, 
MERRIAM–WEBSTER, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ stare%20decisis. 
 102. See, e.g., Geithner Blames, supra note 7 (“Timothy Geithner implied at his confirmation 
hearing that the mistakes in his tax returns were caused by his use of the TurboTax software program.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (2011); Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summ.Op. 2010-78 (2010); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82 (2010). 
 104. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012). 
 105. See Lam, 99 T.C.M. at 3; Anyika, 101 T.C.M. at 5. 
 106. Lam, 99 T.C.M. at 3. 
 107. See Parker, T.C. Summ.Op. at 7. 
 108. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 2 (2010). 
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professional,109 and, after reviewing his tax return, did not notice that 
the income was not listed.110  
B. The Tax Court’s Alternatives 
The Olsen decision marked the first time that the Tax Court approved 
the TurboTax Defense, thereby opening the doors for a slew of litigation 
using this once-defunct excuse.111  Before accepting the taxpayer’s 
proposed rule of law, the Tax Court could have explored alternative 
courses of action. 
As the summary opinion appears to rest on the good faith exception 
of § 6664(c)(1) of the Code,112 the Tax Court could have chosen to leave 
out the TurboTax language and relied solely on Olsen’s reasonable 
cause and good faith.  Or, the Tax Court could have accepted the 
TurboTax Defense as an extension of the already well-accepted reliance 
on professional advice exception,113 treating TurboTax as the 
professional providing advice.  
Despite alternatives available to avoid penalizing the taxpayer, the 
Tax Court should have abandoned its desire to find that Olsen was not 
liable for the accuracy-related penalties and followed the recent 
precedent of disallowing the TurboTax Defense,114 thereby avoiding the 
expert backlash115 as well as the potential for future meritless claims.116  
1. Good Faith Exception of § 6664(c)(1) 
The Tax Court in Olsen concluded that Olsen was not liable for 
accuracy-related penalties because he acted in accordance with the 
reasonable cause exception for underpayments.117  Section 6664(c)(1) of 
 
 109. See id. at 3. 
 110. Id. at 7. 
 111. See, e.g., Surprising Experts, supra note 3 (“Such mistakes happen all the time, and they are 
easy to make.  We’re likely to see more of these cases.”). 
 112. The reasonable cause exception for underpayments states that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed 
under Section 6662 or 6663 with respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was 
a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such 
portion.”  I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 113. The treasury regulations state that “[r]eliance on an information return, professional advice, 
or other facts . . . constitutes reasonable cause and good faith if, under all the circumstances, such 
reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2012) 
(emphasis added). 
 114. See, e.g., Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (2011); Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summ.Op. 2010-78 (2010); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82 (2010). 
 115. See infra Part III(B). 
 116. See Surprising Experts, supra note 3 (“Such mistakes happen all the time, and they are easy 
to make.  We’re likely to see more of these cases.”). 
 117. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 7 (2011). 
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the Code provides that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed . . . with respect 
to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was a 
reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good 
faith with respect to such portion.”118  The most important factor in 
determining whether the exception applies is the extent of the taxpayer’s 
effort to properly assess his or her tax liability.119  The Tax Court 
determined that Olsen “did not bury his head in the sand and ignore his 
obligation to check the accuracy of his tax return,” and instead found 
that he made his best effort to assess his tax liability.120  
The Tax Court could have relied on the reasonable cause/good faith 
exception without any reference to Olsen’s TurboTax Defense.  In fact, 
the summary opinion appears to turn completely on the exception.  It 
would not be incongruous with other areas of tax jurisprudence that 
allow a taxpayer to escape extra liabilities beyond the taxes incurred 
based solely on the taxpayer’s good faith. 
For instance, other areas of tax law have carved out exceptions based 
on the taxpayer’s good faith.  Criminal tax law is one example.  
Criminal provisions of the Code provide that a taxpayer must “willfully” 
evade his or her taxes to be liable.121  In response, the Supreme Court 
has defined “willfulness” through a series of opinions,122 and has 
ultimately reached the conclusion that the standard is “voluntary, 
intentional violation of a known legal duty.”123 
Section 7201 of the Code provides that “[a]ny person who willfully 
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed . . . or the 
payment thereof” is guilty of a felony.124  Likewise, § 7203 requires that 
 
 118. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012). 
 119. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 4. 
 120. Id. at 7.  The Tax Court found that Olsen’s efforts were extensive, including upgrading his 
tax preparation software to a more sophisticated version, correctly identifying the trust as the source of 
the income, correctly entering the trust’s tax identification number, and reviewing the information he 
entered.  Id. at 6–7.  “Despite his best efforts, however, [Olsen] failed to discover that the amount of the 
interest income did not appear on the final version of his tax return that was filed.”  Id. at 7. 
 121. See I.R.C. § 7201 (2012) (requiring a taxpayer to willfully evade or defeat taxes imposed in 
order to be guilty of a felony); I.R.C. § 7203 (2012) (requiring a taxpayer to willfully fail to file a tax 
return to be guilty of a misdemeanor). 
 122. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (“[T]he standard for the statutory 
willfulness requirement is the ‘voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.’”); United States 
v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973) (“The Court, in fact has recognized that the word ‘willfully’ in 
these statutes generally connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.  It has 
formulated the requirement of willfulness as ‘bad faith or evil intent’”); United States v. Murdock, 290 
U.S. 389, 394–95 (1933) (“[W]hen used in a criminal statute, [willfully] generally means an act done 
with a bad purpose . . . This court has held that, where directions as to the method of conducting a 
business are embodied in a revenue act to prevent loss of taxes, and the act declares a willful failure to 
observe the directions a penal offense, an evil motive is a constituent element of the crime.”). 
 123. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201. 
 124. I.R.C. § 7201 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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“[a]ny person required . . . to make a return . . . who willfully fails 
to . . . make such return” is guilty of a misdemeanor.125  Therefore, 
determining the meaning of “willfulness” has been important in shaping 
criminal liability of taxpayers. 
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided a case that turned on the meaning 
of the word “willfully” as used in the Code.126  In Cheek, the taxpayer 
had been found guilty of six counts of willfully failing to file a federal 
income tax return and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his 
income taxes.127  Cheek stopped paying his income taxes once he began 
attending seminars sponsored by a group of individuals who advocated 
that the federal tax system is unconstitutional.128  Some of the speakers 
were attorneys who purported to give professional opinions.129  Cheek, 
therefore, admitted that he did not pay his taxes for the six years in 
question, but defended his conduct on his sincere belief that the tax laws 
were being unconstitutionally enforced—essentially, that he had acted 
without the willfulness required for criminal liability.130 
The Court agreed that Cheek had not acted with the required 
willfulness, and noted that his good-faith belief did not have to be 
objectively reasonable.131  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
described the evolution from the strict common law rule, which held that 
ignorance of the law is no defense to criminal prosecution, to the 
creation of the applicable exception, that specific intent is required for 
the action to be willful in the criminal tax context.132  Criminal tax 
offenses, the Court noted, are afforded this special treatment “largely 
due to the complexity of the tax laws.”133  
Therefore, for the government to prove the willfulness of a 
defendant’s actions, it must show “that the law imposed a duty on the 
defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily 
and intentionally violated that duty.”134  If the government can 
demonstrate that the defendant had actual knowledge, then the 
knowledge component is satisfied unless the defendant “had a good-
faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax 
laws.”135  This belief, known as the good-faith defense, has heightened 
 
 125. I.R.C. § 7203 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 126. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 194. 
 127. Id. at 194, 198. 
 128. Id. at 195–96. 
 129. Id. at 196. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 203. 
 132. Id. at 199–200. 
 133. Id. at 200. 
 134. Id. at 201. 
 135. Id. at 202. 
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the standard of knowledge for a taxpayer facing criminal charges for tax 
liability. 
Given the willingness of tax jurisprudence to make exceptions for 
taxpayers who can demonstrate that their tax errors or evasions stem 
from a good-faith error, framing the analysis solely in terms of good 
faith could have been an appropriate course of action.  The Tax Court 
could have ignored the TurboTax Defense and focused solely on the 
§ 6664(c)(1) exception.  The exception would have disposed of the issue 
and justified finding no accuracy-related penalties.  The Tax Court 
reasoned that an isolated transcription error is not inconsistent with a 
finding of reasonable cause and good faith,136 consistent with the 
Treasury regulations,137 and that was as far as the analysis needed to go. 
2. Professional Advice Exception 
Perhaps the Tax Court did not rely solely on the exception carved out 
in § 6664(c)(1) because the exception is often used in conjunction with 
specific circumstances.  Instead, the Tax Court could have also relied on 
the professional advice exception.  If a taxpayer can demonstrate that he 
relied on the advice of a professional, and that such reliance was 
reasonable and in good faith, then he may be able to invoke the good 
faith exception of § 6664(c)(1).  The professional advice exception, 
although not currently accepted as encompassing the TurboTax Defense, 
could be a viable alternative for the Tax Court to avoid penalizing 
taxpayers for mistakes it deems to be made in good faith. 
In some of the cases where the Tax Court rejected the TurboTax 
Defense, it also addressed the professional advice exception.138  
However, the Tax Court’s treatment of the issue was inconsistent.  In 
one case, the Tax Court treated TurboTax as the professional but found 
that the professional advice exception was inapplicable because “[t]ax 
preparation software, like TurboTax, is only as good as the information 
one inputs into it.”139  In another, the Tax Court found that TurboTax 
was not a professional preparer and that the professional advice 
 
 136. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 5–6 (2011). 
 137. The Treasury regulations provide that“[a]n isolated computational or transcriptional error 
generally is not inconsistent with reasonable cause and good faith.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) 
(2012). 
 138. See Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2010-78, 5 (2010) (“Reliance on the advice of a 
professional does not necessarily demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith unless . . . such reliance 
was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith.”); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82, 3 (2010) 
(“[R]eliance upon the advice of a tax professional may establish . . . reasonable cause and good faith for 
the purposes of avoiding a section 6662(a) penalty.”). 
 139. Parker, T.C. Summ.Op. at 5 (internal quotations omitted). 
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exception could not, therefore, be reached.140  Despite this inconsistent 
treatment of the professional advice exception as it applies to the 
TurboTax Defense, the exception could be an acceptable way to dispose 
of taxpayer penalties when the taxpayer has reasonably relied on tax 
preparation software. 
Treasury Regulation § 1.6664-4 details when the good faith exception 
of § 6664(c)(1) of the Code applies due to reliance on professional 
advice.141  The regulation defines advice as “any 
communication . . . setting forth the analysis or conclusion of a person, 
other than the taxpayer, provided to (or for the benefit of) the taxpayer 
and on which the taxpayer relies.”142  Advice does not have to be in any 
particular form, but it must be based on all pertinent facts and 
circumstances and must not be based on unreasonable factual or legal 
assumptions.143  A taxpayer’s reliance on the advice of a professional 
must be objectively reasonable.144  Advice is only objective if the 
taxpayer has provided the professional with information that is both 
necessary and accurate.145 
The Tax Court could have embraced the TurboTax Defense within 
the professional advice exception, thereby avoiding further expansion 
and complication of tax jurisprudence.  The regulation does not dictate 
the form of advice, only that it must be a communication that analyzes a 
taxpayer’s situation upon which the taxpayer relies.146  In Olsen, the Tax 
Court found that Olsen “acted reasonably in upgrading his tax 
preparation software to a more sophisticated version” so that he could 
properly report the unfamiliar income.147  The Tax Court could have 
found that the tax preparation software constituted professional advice, 
seeing as it is software designed specifically for the purpose of 
providing accurate tax services to customers with personalized tax 
advice.148  Bolstering this approach is the fact that Olsen exercised an 
option to upgrade his TurboTax software for more sophisticated tax 
inquiries.149 
Further, the regulations require that the taxpayer’s reliance be 
 
 140. Lam, T.C.M. at 3 (discussing the contours of the professional advice exception and then 
holding that the taxpayer “did not rely on a professional preparer, but used TurboTax and stipulated to 
preparing her own returns without a tax professional”). 
 141. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c) (2012). 
 142. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(2). 
 143. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i)&(c)(2). 
 144. See, e.g., Parker, T.C. Summ.Op. at 5. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664(c)(2). 
 147. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 6 (2011). 
 148. See, e.g., TURBOTAX, http://turbotax.intuit.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
 149. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 3. 
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objective, which requires the taxpayer to accurately provide the 
professional with all pertinent facts.150  The Tax Court found that Olsen 
had correctly identified the source of income and the identification 
number in the software,151 which would be objective evidence that he 
had given the tax professional, TurboTax, the pertinent facts.  Olsen’s 
isolated transcription error is where the calculation went awry,152 which 
arguably would not have affected his objectively reasonable reliance on 
the software. 
3. Impose Accuracy-Related Penalties 
The reasonable cause exception for excusing accuracy-related 
penalties requires a showing “that there was a reasonable cause for [the 
underpayment] and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to 
[it].”153  Courts determine this case-by-case, taking into account all 
pertinent facts and circumstances and, most importantly, the extent of 
the taxpayer’s effort to assess his proper liability.154  “Circumstances 
that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest 
misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all the facts 
and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education 
of the taxpayer.”155 
In the previous decisions confronting the TurboTax Defense, the Tax 
Court found that the reasonable cause exception was inapplicable.  In 
Lam v. Commissioner, the Tax Court refused to exercise the exception 
because the taxpayer did not behave “in a manner consistent with that of 
a prudent person” and “did not consult a tax professional or visit the IRS 
website for instructions on filing.”156  The Court further held that it did 
“not accept [the taxpayer’s] misuse of TurboTax, even if unintentional 
or accidental, as a defense to the penalties” and that the underpayments 
were a result of the taxpayer’s own negligence.157 
The Tax Court also refused to excuse the accuracy-related penalties 
assessed in Anyika v. Commissioner.158  It noted that the taxpayers did 
not provide any evidence showing that the software was at fault and 
further noted that “software is only as good as the information the 
 
 150. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (2012); Parker, T.C. Summ.Op. at 5. 
 151. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 6–7 (2011). 
 152. Id. at 6. 
 153. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012). 
 154. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82, 3 (2010). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. 2011-69, 6 (2011). 
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taxpayer puts into it,” reiterating the finding in Lam that “the misuse of 
tax preparation software, even if unintentional or accidental, is no 
defense to penalties.”159  The Tax Court held that a reasonable person in 
the Anyikas’ position would have understood that the tax law governing 
this particular issue was complex and would have then consulted a tax 
professional instead of making assumptions.160  
Finally, in Parker v. Commissioner, the Tax Court would not excuse 
accuracy-related penalties because the taxpayer was aware of his tax 
responsibilities and because he either knew, or should have known by 
reviewing his returns, that he had not properly reported his tax 
responsibilities.161  The Tax Court also rejected the taxpayer’s reliance 
on unidentified TurboTax experts with whom he had consulted while 
preparing his returns.162 
Given the reasoning previously employed by the Tax Court when 
confronted with the TurboTax Defense to accuracy-related penalties, it 
would have been proper, and even expected, for the Olsen Court to 
impose the accuracy-related penalties.  Following precedent, the Tax 
Court should have found that Olsen did not act reasonably and in good 
faith in reporting his income.  Following the reasoning in Lam, the Tax 
Court should have found that Olsen was unreasonable in that he neither 
consulted a tax professional nor the IRS website to determine how to 
properly report income with which he was unfamiliar.163  As in Anyika, 
the Tax Court should have found that Olsen should have known that the 
tax law was complex when he was confronted with a type of income to 
which he had never been exposed,164 and, if he had been a reasonable 
person, he would have consulted a tax professional instead of assuming 
that he could figure it out just by upgrading his software.  As in Parker, 
the Tax Court should have found that Olsen knew or reasonably would 
have known he had made an error when the amount of the particular 
income at question did not appear on the final version of his tax 
return.165  
Finally, a reading of the Code and Treasury regulations would also 
substantiate a finding that imposition of accuracy-related penalties was 
warranted in Olsen.166  The regulations require the Tax Court to take 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 5. 
 161. Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2010-78, 7 (2010). 
 162. Id. at 6. 
 163. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 2 (Olsen’s “wife received a Schedule K-1 . . . Prior to this instance, 
the couple had never received a Schedule K-1 and were unfamiliar with the form”). 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. at 7 (“Despite his best efforts, however, [Olsen] failed to discover that the amount of the 
interest income did not appear on the final version of his tax return that was filed.”). 
 166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2012). 
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into account the experience, knowledge, and education of the 
taxpayer.167  Olsen admittedly had no experience with the particular 
income he failed to report properly.168  However, Olsen was a highly 
educated patent attorney for the government,169 which, as pointed out by 
some observers,170 should have motivated him to seek professional 
advice.  Olsen was someone who should have understood that dealing 
with government forms is highly complex and requires specialized 
knowledge.  Therefore, the Tax Court should have found that it was 
unreasonable for Olsen to not seek professional tax advice, or to at least 
search the IRS website for advice on how to properly report this 
unfamiliar income. 
V. CONCLUSION  
The seemingly innocuous Olsen summary opinion sparked 
controversy in allowing the TurboTax Defense, and for good reason.  
The Tax Court’s decision to abandon precedent cut directly against the 
Tax Court’s previous findings that the TurboTax Defense was 
meritless171 and opened the floodgates for even more taxpayers to claim 
that return errors are the fault of tax preparation software.172 
The Tax Court’s decision was also flawed in that it was based on bad 
facts—facts that did not properly fit the TurboTax Defense.173  Further, 
if the Tax Court was determined to find that Olsen was not liable for 
accuracy-related penalties, it had other alternatives that would reach the 
same result without expanding tax jurisprudence.174  Or, the Tax Court 
should have followed precedent, as was expected by the tax community, 
and found that Olsen was liable for accuracy-related penalties based on 
his own inexcusable error.175 
After exploring the contours of the statutory and case law behind the 
Olsen decision, the question remains: Why even allow the TurboTax 
Defense?  This is a question that is expected to be debated in the years 
to come, as the use of tax preparation software continues to be a popular 
 
 167. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b). 
 168. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 3 (2011). 
 169. Id. at 2. 
 170. See, e.g., Tax Court Rules in Favor, supra note 88 (“Did Mr. Olsen ever think of hiring a 
professional knowledgeable in the preparation of income tax returns?  What would he think of a novice 
trying to defend a patent matter?”). 
 171. See infra Part II(B). 
 172. See Surprising Experts, supra note 3 (“Such mistakes happen all the time, and they are easy 
to make.  We’re likely to see more of these cases.”). 
 173. See infra Part IV(A)(1). 
 174. See infra Part IV(B)(1–2). 
 175. See infra Part IV(B)(3). 
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alternative to seeking advice from a certified tax professional.  
Therefore, the Tax Court should be wary of its future decisions, and 
consider just how “reasonable”176 it is for a taxpayer to underpay on his 
tax liabilities when relying on tax preparation software, software which 
“is only as good as the information one inputs into it.”177 
  
 
 176. I.R.C. § 6664(c) (2012).  The Tax Court will not impose an accuracy-related penalty “if it is 
shown that there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with 
respect to such portion.”  I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012). 
 177. Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2010-78, 5 (2010). 
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